Board structure and corporate risk-taking: Empirical evidence from Vietnamese enterprises
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.56294/sctconf2024.1444Keywords:
Board structure, corporate risk-taking, VietnamAbstract
The research investigates the relationship between board structure and corporate risk-taking among publicly listed companies in Vietnam. We examine the impact of factors such as board size, independence, and duality on corporate risk-taking behavior. Our sample is based on an unbalanced panel dataset of listed firms on the Vietnamese stock exchange, excluding commercial banks, covering the period from 2012 to 2023. Using the generalized method of moments estimator to address potential endogeneity issues, the results suggest that larger board size, a higher proportion of independent directors, and a reduction in the number of executive directors are associated with lower levels of corporate risk-taking. In contrast, an increased presence of executive directors is positively correlated with higher corporate risk-taking. These findings contribute to the understanding of corporate governance and may inform regulatory and policy decisions.
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