Memory and material engagement: an ecological-enactive model

Abstract

Memory has been traditionally defined as a psychological capacity allowing subjects to store information "in the mind" to recover it later. This definition, supportive of a Cartesian perspective, assumes that cognition is a form of internal information processing. In recent years, the 5E paradigms (i.e., embodied, extended, enactive, embedded, ecological) have emerged as an alternative to orthodox perspectives and emphasized the constitutive role of the body and environment in cognition. By defining cognition as adaptive behavior, these paradigms have questioned the scope of certain basic concepts in the cognitive sciences, such as "agency", "meaning", and "mental representation." In this presentation, I will introduce an ecological-enactive model of memory based on the Material Engagement Theory (Prezioso & Alessandroni, 2022; see also Malafouris & Koukouti, 2018) and discuss its implications for psychological research. Specifically, I will defend: (i) that "memory" does not refer to an internal capacity but to a type of activity that subjects carry out when they interact in and with the world; (ii) that "remembering" does not occur thanks to the encoding, storage, and retrieval of mental content but to the update of specific forms of interaction with material culture; and (iii) that objects (e.g., a cup or a spoon) are full-fledged cognitive agents because they prompt us to re-instantiate forms of material engagement previously experienced. Considering these three points, I will highlight the urgent need to conduct studies considering the cognitive ecologies wherein subjects remember. Finally, I will address the relationship between the proposed model and other contemporary contributions on the development of conceptual thinking and intentional understanding (Alessandroni, 2021, 2023; Vietri et al., 2022).